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Abstract In robustness analysis, hypotheses are supported to the extent that a result
proves robust, and a result is robust to the extent that we detect it in diverse ways. But
what precise sense of diversity is at work here? In this paper, I show that the formal
explications of evidential diversity most often appealed to in work on robustness –
which all draw in one way or another on probabilistic independence – fail to shed
light on the notion of diversity relevant to robustness analysis. I close by briefly
outlining a promising alternative approach inspired by Horwich’s (1982) eliminative
account of evidential diversity.
1 Robustness Analysis in Science
To verify that results are not simply artifacts of the particular means used to detect
them, scientists often attempt to duplicate those results using other, diverse means.
To the extent that a result is detected via numerous, diverse means, it is said to be
robust. Robustness analysis (henceforth, “RA”) is a mode of reasoning in which one
supports a hypothesis via an analysis of the conditions under which a result is robust.
Examples of RA from scientific practice abound. Famously, biologist Richard
Levins (1966) proposes RA as a general means for deciphering, when using simpli-
fied models to study complex systems, whether a result “depends on the essentials
of a model or on the details of the simplifying assumptions:”
[W]e attempt to treat the same problem with several alternative models each with different
simplifications but with a common biological assumption. Then, if these models, despite
their different assumptions, lead to similar results we have what we can call a robust theorem
which is relatively free of the details of the model. Hence our truth is the intersection of
independent lies.
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As a specific example of this use of RA in modeling, Weisberg and Reisman (2008)
discuss work in support of the Volterra Principle:
Volterra Principle Ceteris paribus, if a two-species, predator-prey system is neg-
atively coupled, then a general biocide will increase the abundance of the
prey and decrease the abundance of predators.
The earliest predator-prey models demonstrating the Volterra Principle included
several unrealistic, simplifying assumptions – including single growth- and death-
rates for prey and predators respectively as well as linear functions relating prey
capture-rates to number of predators and predator birth-rates to number of cap-
tures. As Weisberg and Reisman emphasize, however, the Volterra Principle can be
demonstrated robustly across more complicated models that do away with various
of the simplifying assumptions. Some of these models, for example, “add in terms
representing predator satiation, the ability of prey to seek cover, multiple sources of
food for the predator, or even complex adaptive behaviors such as learning” (116).
In this example, the robust result is the observed qualitative behavior of various
models – commonly interpreted as the increased relative size of prey population
when a general biocide is introduced. The diverse means which detect this result are
the mathematical models themselves. And the hypothesis most apparently supported
by the fact that this result is robust is the Volterra Principle – the biological claim,
not to be confused with claims about the mathematical representations of biological
systems.
The case of Brownian motion provides a rather different example of RA in sci-
ence – also commonly discussed by philosophers of science. When suspended in a
fluid medium, sufficiently small particles display continual and seemingly random
movements. Upon discovering this phenomenon, the botanist Robert Brown sur-
mised that the motions were due to the particular (uniquely shaped) pollen granules
he was observing. However, he found that the movements persisted across exper-
iments using other particles – first using other types of pollen, then other organic
materials, and eventually using inorganic particles. Over the next 75 years, other
experimenters showed that the “Brownian motion” was also robust over changes in
the fluid medium, container used, means of suspending the particles, environmen-
tal conditions around the container, and so on. Eventually, scientists working in the
wake of Einstein’s annus mirabilis appealed to the robustness of the Brownian mo-
tion in order to support the idea that there were deeper, unobservable agitations of
molecules within the medium – just as the evident rocking of a far off ship betrays
imperceptibly distant waves on the sea (Perrin 1913, 83).
In this case, the Brownian motion is the result detected robustly. The diverse
means of detection are the various experiments used; regarding these experiments,
the Brownian motion is notably robust across certain changes to the experimental
apparatus (type of particle, medium, container, lighting, etc.) and sensitive to others
(size of particle, temperature of medium). And it is upon analyzing these conditions
of robustness that Perrin (1913, 86) says we are “forced to conclude,” consonant
with Einstein’s molecular explanation, that there are internal, unobservable move-
ments in the medium.
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Many other example RAs include cases from cognitive psychology (Stolarz-
Fantino et al. 2003; Crupi et al. 2008), “arguments from coincidence” in physics
(Hacking 1983; Cartwright 1991; Mayo 1996), experimental biology (Culp 1994),
climate science (Lloyd 2010; Parker 2011), and modeling in economics (Woodward
2006; Kuorikoski et al. 2010). As should be evident from the range of these cases,
I mean for the terms “results” and “means of detection” to be quite generic. The re-
sults in question could be observations, measurements, predictions, theorems, and so
on. Correspondingly, the means of detecting such results could include experiments,
laboratory instruments, sensory modalities, derivations (from axioms, models, the-
ories, etc.), axiomatic systems, computer simulations, and formal models amongst
other things.
2 Evidential Diversity and RA-Diversity
The intuition motivating the use of RA is that we can gain confirmation through
diversity; certain hypotheses (e.g., Einstein’s molecular explanation of Brownian
motion) are supported to the extent that a result proves robust, and results are robust
to the extent that we detect them in diverse ways. But what precise sense of diversity
is involved in RAs? Philosophers have offered many distinct accounts of evidential
diversity. And many of these accounts plausibly capture legitimate senses in which
we speak of evidence as being diverse. But is there a single sense of evidential
diversity that drives our reasoning in RAs? For the sake of this paper, we will work
on the optimistic assumption that there is.
The hope is that a precise account of such “RA-diversity” would illuminate the
normative import of actual RAs. But in order to stand any chance of doing so, such
an account must be held accountable to scientific practice. A particular account
of evidential diversity may, for example, specify precise conditions under which
diverse bodies of evidence provide strong confirmation for relevant hypotheses. But
such an account will clearly not illuminate RA if it relies on a notion of diversity
that does not fit with actual cases of RA in science. Such an account may shed
light on the confirmational import of certain diverse bodies of evidence, just not on
RA-diverse bodies of evidence.
This main section of the present paper applies this consideration in criticizing
the most common formal accounts of RA-diversity. These formalize diversity us-
ing probabilistically-precise notions of independence. Moreover, several of these
accounts imply interesting senses in which diverse bodies of evidence may be spe-
cially confirmatory. The problem is that these accounts fail to capture paradigmatic
cases of RA from science. To show this in each case, I will return to the above
examples of Brownian motion and the Volterra Principle.
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2.1 Unconditional Probabilistic Independence
As a first attempt at explicating RA-diversity, we might take a cue from Levins’s
quote and surmise that some precise notion of “independence” is at work. Most
simply, one might say that if two means of detection are RA-diverse in the relevant
sense, then they are (unconditionally) probabilistically independent of one another.
To make this idea more precise, let R be a proposition describing the result that
has been robustly detected by various means. Then, let us denote the proposition
that this result is detected using the k’th means of detection as Rk. According to
the unconditional probabilistic independence account, if two means of detection
are RA-diverse, then the fact that R is detected via means i should have no bearing
whatever on the probability that R will be detected using means j: Pr(Ri&R j) =
Pr(Ri)×Pr(R j) – which (assuming that Pr(Ri),Pr(R j) > 0) entails that Pr(Ri) =
Pr(Ri|R j) and Pr(R j) = Pr(R j|Ri).1
In their critique of Levins’s discussion of RA, Orzack and Sober (1993, 539-
40) consider and quickly dismiss this explication; they argue that, by requiring the
various models to share “a common biological assumption,” Levins’s “‘Protocol’ for
the discovery of robust predictions guarantees that the models under consideration
are not independent.”2 In a bit more detail and put more explicitly in Bayesian terms,
when such a model implies a particular result in RA settings, we consider it possible
(and perhaps even plausible) that the result is driven by the essential core of the
model – i.e., Levins’s common biological assumption. But then whether or not we
get a result from one of the models will manifestly provide relevant information with
regards to whether we will get the result from another model with the same common
core. Typically, the fact that we have detected R with one such model will increase
the probability that we will detect R using another: Pr(Ri)< Pr(Ri|R j). Importantly,
this may be true despite the fact that these models are considered diverse for the sake
of RA.
For similar reasons, RA-diverse experiments in the case of Brownian motion also
fail to be unconditionally independent. Take any two of these experiments, say those
suspending dust particles in water and those suspending them in ethanol. Although
these are diverse in the relevant sense that makes it appropriate for scientists, like
Perrin, to cite them as part of their RA, the respective results of these experiments
may strongly inform one another. This will be the case, in fact, so long as one al-
lows that other factors (besides whether to use water or ethanol as the medium)
may potentially influence whether one observes the result. These experiments actu-
ally share in common the vast majority of their respective traits – type of particle
used, means of suspending the particle, lighting conditions, etc. – which may all be
1 For clarity and ease of exposition, I leave the background beliefs term implicit in all Bayesian
formulations.
2 Orzack and Sober also criticize an alternative explication according to which two models are di-
verse only if they are logically independent. The fact that RA-diverse models may involve contrary
simplifying assumptions spells trouble for this account; e.g., “A model with the assumption of ran-
dom mating is not logically independent of a model with the assumption that mating is assortative;
the reason is that the truth of one entails the falsity of the other.”
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seen as potentially relevant in affecting the result. But then, observations of Brow-
nian movements in water may greatly increase the probability that one will observe
Brownian movements in ethanol. In this case again, perfectly RA-diverse means of
detection may be such that Pr(Ri)< Pr(Ri|R j).
2.2 Reliability Independence
While this initial effort thus fails, there are subtler ways one can attempt to use
probabilistic independence to explicate RA-diversity. Wimsatt (1994, 197) offers
such an account, proposing “that the probability of failure of the different means of
access should be independent.” This account arguably doubles as a more accurate
interpretation of Levins’s thought that RA requires “independent lies.” The lies,
the ways that each means of detection could lead us astray, are the things that are
required to be independent between RA-diverse means of detection.3
This reliability independence account is importantly distinct from the uncondi-
tional independence account above. Instead of enforcing the stringent condition that
the results of the various means of detection be entirely irrelevant to one another,
this account just requires that if the means in question lead us astray, they do so for
independent reasons. More precisely, learning that one of our means of detection
has misled us has no effect on the probability that the other means of detection will
mislead us. Each means of detection is or isn’t reliable, independent of the others.
One nice feature of this account is the straightforward way in which it reveals the
epistemic appeal of diversity. The justification that a hypothesis receives from evi-
dence that is diverse in this sense has all the logical advantage of webs over chains.
Whereas a linear chain of justification can be no stronger than its weakest link, a
web of independent lines of justification is no weaker than its strongest member.
Wimsatt (1981, 49-50) offers a quick probabilistic demonstration of this as follows:
Assume that we have n means, all of which detect a result. Now assume that these
means are reliability independent. Naturally, these means are imperfect, and so each
may lead us astray with some probability; for simplicity, assume that they each may
lead us astray with the same probability p0. Now, if the common result these means
are all detecting is misleading, then all n means of detection are going astray. Be-
cause they do so independently of one another, we know that the probability of this
happening is pp = pn0. Wimsatt concludes, “But p0 is presumably always less than
1; thus, for n > 1, pp is always less than p0. Adding alternatives for redundancy
always increases reliability.”
Unfortunately, while reliability independence manifestly explicates an important
notion of evidential diversity, it too fails to capture the notion of RA-diversity. First,
return to the example of Brownian motion, and again consider any two of the RA-
diverse means of detection used by Brown; this time, let us compare experiments in
3 Bovens and Hartmann (2003, 96-97) offer an in-depth formal exploration of this notion of evi-
dential diversity, and Kuorikoski et al. (2010, 544-45) follow Wimsatt in adopting this account as
an explication of RA-diversity.
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which a variety of pollen granules were suspended in water with those in which a
variety of inorganic materials were suspended in water. These experiments are again
cited as diverse in the sense required for RA. Yet, their respective reliabilities surely
have a bearing on one another. To be sure, they could be unreliable for different
reasons. But there are any number of common reasons that they might be unreliable
too; there are many possible confounding factors that could be driving the result
in both cases. Both could be misleading us due to the way the particles are being
suspended, due to the use of the same medium, due to the use of the same environ-
mental conditions surrounding the apparatus, etc. To the extent that we are aware of
such overlapping sources of potential unreliability, learning that one of these exper-
iments is leading us astray provides relevant information when deciding whether to
trust the other. In particular, such information will often greatly reduce our estimate
of how reliable the other is.
The reliability independence account encounters the same problem when trying
to model RA-diversity in examples from modeling. Two RA-diverse predator-prey
models that demonstrate the Volterra Principle may differ only on whether they
involve a particular simplifying assumption, say the assumption that prey capture-
rate increases linearly with number of predators. A model that is more realistic in
this one regard and the fully simplified model will share many potential sources of
unreliability when it comes to modeling the complex predator-prey dynamics (e.g.,
not allowing prey to take cover or learn). But then learning that one of the models
is unreliable will potentially greatly increase our confidence that the other is too.
In general, fully RA-diverse means of detection can nonetheless be susceptible to
many of the same potential confounds; in such cases, learning that one of our means
of detection is unreliable will often greatly increase the likeliness that other of our
means of detection is similarly unreliable.
2.3 Confirmational and Conditional Independence
Lloyd (2009; 2010) has recently proposed a third independence-based account
worth considering here. She proposes that RA-diversity amounts to confirmational
independence, as explicated by Fitelson (2001). This sense is defined relative to a
particular hypothesis (call it H), which we may think of as the hypothesis intuitively
supported via the RA. Two means of detection are RA-diverse, according to this ac-
count, only if their results incrementally confirm / disconfirm H (raise / lower H’s
probability) to the same extent regardless of whether we have detected and learned
the results using the other means. More formally (using the notation we introduced
in Section 2.1 above, and where c stands in for an adopted Bayesian measure of in-
cremental confirmation): if the i’th and j’th means of detection are RA-diverse with
respect to H, then c(H,Ri|R j) = c(H,Ri) and c(H,Ri|R j) = c(H,R j).4
4 Notation: c(x,y) measures the degree of confirmation that y lends to x; c(x,y|z) measures the
degree of confirmation that y lends to x, conditional on (or given that) z.
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As with Wimsatt’s account of evidential diversity, this idea nicely illuminates
the normative appeal of diversifying our evidence. Accepting any of the most de-
fensible and popular Bayesian measures of confirmation as c, and assuming that
each detection of R individually confirms H to some extent, one can prove that
confirmationally independent means of detection jointly confirm H to a greater ex-
tent than either means of detection does individually: c(H,Ri&R j) > c(H,Ri) and
c(H,Ri&R j)> c(H,R j) (Fitelson 2001, S131).
Before evaluating this account, it is worth mentioning that confirmational inde-
pendence has a direct connection to conditional probabilistic independence, relative
to H. As Fitelson (2001, S129) clarifies, “screening-off by H of Ri from R j is a suffi-
cient condition for Ri and R j to be mutually confirmationally independent regarding
H.”5 By “screening-off,” Fitelson has in mind the standard Reichenbachian (1956,
158-59) notion, implying the dual conditional independencies: Pr(Ri&R j|H) =
Pr(Ri|H)×Pr(R j|H) and Pr(Ri&R j|¬H) = Pr(Ri|¬H)×Pr(R j|¬H).
Unfortunately, confirmational independence also does not fit with the notion of
RA-diversity. Consider again two experiments from the Brownian motion case. Let
R1 describe the fact that we have observed Brownian motion using the uniquely
shaped and sized pollen granules of Clarkia pulchella (the wildflower first used by
Brown in his experiments), and let R2 be the proposition that we have witnessed
the same motions using other types of pollen. While these two results are diverse
in the sense that makes them crucial to establishing the robustness of Brownian
motion (and both mentioned explicitly as such by Perrin), they are evidently not
confirmationally independent regarding H: Perrin’s inferred hypothesis that there
are unobservable movements internal to fluid media. To assert that they are would
be to claim that his hypothesis is supported to the same extent by R1, regardless
of whether we know R2. But while H may be strongly supported by experiments
observing the jostling of granules of a particular type of pollen, it plausibly does
not gain nearly so much support from such an observation if one has already wit-
nessed the jostling using several other types of pollen: c(H,R1|R2) < c(H,R1). On
the contrary, the more pollens that we have already observed in motion, the less a
confirmatory impact on H future experiments using pollens will have.
The following observation helps us to see why this account does not work from
another angle. The fact that these diverse means of detection are not confirmation-
ally independent regarding H implies that their results also will not be screened-off
by H. Here, we can pinpoint the feature of screening-off that generally will not be
satisfied by these experiments, the clause that asserts that R1 and R2 should be in-
dependent conditional on ¬H: Pr(R1&R2|¬H) = Pr(R1|¬H)×Pr(R2|¬H). If H is
false, there remain many potential reasons why we might see particles dance about
in fluids. Take for example the idea H ′ that this motion is due to the nature of the
suspended particle. Conditional on H ′, the observation of Brownian motion using
various pollens will greatly increase the probability of witnessing it in other pollens:
Pr(R1|H ′)Pr(R1|H ′&R2). After all, on this hypothesis, this motion is attributable
5 I have replaced Fitelson’s notation with our own. It should be noted that Fitelson suggests this
relation as a condition of adequacy on measures of confirmation, as opposed to proving and pre-
senting it as a theorem that follows robustly (!) for all candidate measures.
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to some aspect of the suspended particle; but then witnessing it across samples of
pollen will make us more confident that all pollens share the relevant attribute (e.g.,
the sexual drive or vital force inherent in the particles). More generally, given that H
is false, we might still observe R according to several alternative possibilities. And
RA-diverse means of detecting R can be probabilistically relevant to one another
conditional on these other possibilities.
Similar points weigh against the idea that confirmational or conditional indepen-
dence explicates RA-diversity in cases from modeling. For example, conditional on
the Volterra Principle being false, there could be several reasons why our models are
displaying qualitative behavior interpreted in accordance with this principle. For ex-
ample, perhaps this behavior is in part an artifact of the unrealistic assumption that
prey are borne at a single constant rate. Conditional on the hypothesis that this par-
tially drives our result, two RA-diverse models that both assume single growth-rates
for prey (e.g., two models differing only on whether they represent predator satia-
tion) may be substantially probabilistically relevant to one another; if one provides
the result, this may greatly increase the probability that the other will too.
2.4 Partial Independence?
One might think that the problem is just that we have framed the above accounts
as requiring full unconditional, reliability, or confirmational independence. But per-
haps we can make these accounts more defensible by adjusting them to measure
degrees of RA-diversity. Two means of detection are RA-diverse, we might say, to
the extent that they approach full unconditional, reliability, or confirmational inde-
pendence. Wimsatt (1981, 46) may have just this sort of move in mind when he
writes, “All these procedures require at least partial independence of the various
processes across which invariance is shown.”
But note that the reasons above for why these accounts fail have little to do with
the fact that we require full independence. The problem, in other words, is not that
the RA-diverse means of detection in these paradigmatic cases fall just short of full
independence in one of the three senses. In fact, we have seen that means of detec-
tion that are recognizably and clearly RA-diverse may not even come remotely close
to being independent in any of the above three senses. Nor is it at all clear that we
would end up with means of detection that are more RA-diverse if we sought those
that came closer to full unconditional, reliability, or confirmational independence.
In fact, in all of the examples proffered, the means of detection are intuitively fully
diverse in the sense required for them to do their work in RA. When Perrin cites ex-
periments detecting Brownian motion using organic particles, and then those using
inorganic particles, there is a sense in which these means of detection are perfectly
diverse in the sense needed for these to have their respective roles in Perrin’s larger
RA. And there is no clear reason to think that Perrin’s cited means could have been
improved in their RA-diversity roles had they been less dependent in one of the
above probabilistically precise senses.
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What is this general role that means of detection are meant to perform by virtue
of their RA-diversity? The answer that I want to explore is, in a word, elimination.
While the experiments that Perrin cites and the models used to demonstrate the
Volterra Principle are actually, in several cases, overall quite similar to one another,
they inevitably remain distinct in ways that make them useful for ruling out H’s
potential competitors. In fact, there is already an account of evidential diversity that
fits well with this eliminative idea. The following, closing section briefly explores
this account and whether it holds more promise as an explication of RA-diversity.
3 Toward an Alternative Explication of RA-Diversity
Horwich (1982, 118-22) proposes an account of evidential diversity. While this ac-
count is probabilistic, it does not make use of probabilistic independence. The cen-
tral notion in Horwich’s account is instead that of elimination; diverse bodies of
evidence, according to Horwich, “tend to eliminate from consideration many of the
initially most plausible, competing hypotheses” (118). Probabilistically, Horwich
represents “initially plausible” competing hypotheses as those with substantial prior
probabilities, and he identifies diverse evidence with evidence that takes low likeli-
hoods conditional on competing hypotheses.
Horwich argues for the normative appeal of diverse evidence using his account
in the following way. Let ED describe a more eliminatively diverse body of ev-
idence than EN relative to our favored target hypothesis H1 and its competitors
H2,H3, ...,Hk. We can compare the probabilistic effects of both sets of evidence
on H1 by comparing Pr(H1|ED) to Pr(H1|EN). Horwich stipulates that the alterna-
tive hypotheses form a partition {H1,H2, ...,Hk} and that H1 implies EN and ED, so
that Pr(EN |H1) = Pr(ED|H1) = 1. Under these conditions, we have:
Pr(H1|ED)
Pr(H1|EN) =
Pr(H1)
Pr(H1)
× Pr(ED|H1)
Pr(EN |H1) ×
Pr(EN)
Pr(ED)
=
Pr(EN)
Pr(ED)
=
Pr(H1)+Pr(H2)Pr(EN |H2)+ ...+Pr(Hk)Pr(EN |Hk)
Pr(H1)+Pr(H2)Pr(ED|H2)+ ...+Pr(Hk)Pr(ED|Hk) .
Comparing like terms between the numerator and denominator of this ratio, the only
terms that may affect a difference between Pr(H1|ED) and Pr(H1|EN) are the likeli-
hoods relative to H1’s competitors. Consequently, to the extent that all of those hy-
potheses with considerable values of Pr(Hi) are such that Pr(ED|Hi)< Pr(EN |Hi),
it will tend to be the case that Pr(H1|ED) > Pr(H1|EN). But that is just to say that
the more eliminatively diverse the evidence in this case, the more confirmation it
will tend to bestow upon H1.
If we use this account to explicate RA-diversity, we have that means of detection
(cited in a RA to H) are diverse insofar as they are able to rule out H’s competi-
tors. On such an account, it is not so important that means of detection are strongly
diverse or sufficiently distinct in some sense separated from considered hypothe-
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ses. What really matters for RA-diversity is that the means (which may actually be
quite similar in most respects) are different in just the sense required to rule out
H’s salient competitors. Accordingly, when seeking to increase the RA-diversity of
our evidence, we search for a new way of detecting R that rules out some of H’s
still-standing competitors.
Such an eliminative account of RA-diversity makes better sense of standard cases
of RA in science. Many of the RA-diverse means of detecting Brownian motion are
overall just not that diverse; indeed, these means may be identical in all respects
other than some modest change – e.g., in the particle suspended or mode of sus-
pending it. This is why accounts that require RA-diverse means to be strongly di-
verse (often in a sense that pays no attention to the relevant hypotheses) run quickly
into trouble in this case. These means of detection are clearly eliminatively diverse,
however. When Perrin cites experiments on Clarkia pulchella, and then increments
the RA by citing experiments on other varieties of pollen, he is not doing so be-
cause these experiments are strongly heterogeneous overall, but because they are
relevantly different than one another. The latter rules out a potential confounding
hypothesis left standing by the first – viz., that the motion is attributable to the
unique form of Clarkia pulchella granules.
Similarly, when seeking to confirm the Volterra Principle, RA-diverse models
may be identical but for some modest difference. By utilizing these RA-diverse
models, we rule out confounding hypotheses pertaining to our result left standing
by any subset of the models used alone. Notably, we alleviate worries that our result
is an artifact of a simplifying assumption common to some subset of our models by
duplicating that result using a new model that does not share that assumption.
Though the eliminative account provides a prima facie more promising approach
to explicating RA-diversity, much work remains for any satisfactory account in this
vein. Perhaps most obviously, we would ultimately like a more subtle demonstra-
tion of the normative impact of eliminative diversity as it relates to RAs. There are
several features of Horwich’s demonstration that make it less informative regarding
RAs. First, the general setting of Horwich’s result has us comparing two bodies of
evidence, one more and one less diverse, at the end of the collection process. But
in practice, we are rarely at the end of an RA, and we are not directly interested
in comparing two hypothetical bodies of evidence. The normative intuition that we
would like to test is that H receives more confirmation with each increment of RA;
consequently, a more informative account would examine the confirmatory effects
on H of adding RA-diverse means of detecting the result to our working body of
evidence.
Second, Horwich’s demonstration hinges on some very specific problematic as-
sumptions. In RAs, it is not obvious that we should require H to imply the detected
results in question; this assumption will either need to be weakened or it will require
further motivation. Nor is it obvious that all RAs involve hypotheses that compete
in the sense of being mutually exclusive; in fact, in the Brownian motion case, Per-
rin’s favored hypothesis is consistent with many of the competing hypotheses that
get ruled out (e.g., it’s possible that the motion is affected both by unobservable
motions internal to the medium and by a vital force inherent in the particle used).
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Horwich assumes too that the hypotheses before us exhaust the possibility space
(they form a partition). But of course, in actual cases of RA, more often than not,
this is not the case. And we would accordingly like an account that informs us of
the epistemic import of RA-diversity in cases involving a catch-all hypothesis.
Third, Horwich’s account tells us that, under all of the above conditions, more
diverse evidence does indeed tend to bestow more confirmation on the relevant sort
of hypothesis. But it would be nice if our account could tell us more than this. Is RA
confirmatory under other conditions? And what determines the extent of confirma-
tion that an increment of RA provides?
Finally, Fitelson (1996) suggests that Horwich’s account is more properly viewed
as an explication of the logical effects of diverse evidence than an explication of di-
verse evidence. There is an “intuitive notion” of evidential diversity that underlies
and motivates Horwich’s discussion of eliminative diversity. However, argues Fitel-
son, this intuitive notion proves elusive, and so Horwich’s account is at best incom-
plete. A more appealing account of RA-diversity might provide the missing pieces
here, starting from a more intuitive notion of diversity and then showing that some-
thing like Horwich’s eliminative account captures in part the logical implications of
such diversity. All of these considerations point to ways in which a fuller account
of RA-diversity along the eliminativist lines will need to expand upon Horwich’s
account.
Acknowledgements I am grateful for the helpful conversations I have shared on this topic with
Aki Lehtinen, Chiara Lisciandra, Gerhard Schurz, Jacob Stegenga, and Ioannis Votsis. Also, thanks
to two anonymous referees for their helpful suggestions, which allowed me to improve an earlier
draft of this paper. Research for this article was supported by an Aldrich Fellowship from the
University of Utah’s Tanner Humanities Center, and was conducted during a visit to the Du¨sseldorf
Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science.
References
Bovens, L., & Hartmann, S. (2003). Bayesian Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Cartwright, N. (1991). Replicability, reproducibility, and robustness: Comments on
Harry Collins. History of Political Economy, 23(1), 143–155.
Crupi, V., Fitelson, B., & Tentori, K. (2008). Probability, confirmation, and the
conjunction fallacy. Thinking and Reasoning, 14(2), 182–199.
Culp, S. (1994). Defending robustness: The bacterial mesosome as a test case. PSA:
Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 1:
Contributed Papers, 46–57.
Fitelson, B. (1996). Wayne, Horwich, and evidential diversity. Philosophy of Sci-
ence, 63(4), 652–660.
Fitelson, B. (2001). A Bayesian account of independent evidence with applications.
Philosophy of Science, 68(3), S123–S140.
12 Jonah N. Schupbach
Hacking, I. (1983). Representing and Intervening. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
Horwich, P. (1982). Probability and Evidence. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Kuorikoski, J., Lehtinen, A., & Marchionni, C. (2010). Economic modelling as
robustness analysis. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 61(3), 541–
567.
Levins, R. (1966). The strategy of model building in population biology. American
Scientist, 54(4), 421–431.
Lloyd, E. A. (2009). Varieties of support and confirmation of climate models. Pro-
ceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, 83, 213–232.
Lloyd, E. A. (2010). Confirmation and robustness of climate models. Philosophy of
Science, 77(5), 971–984.
Mayo, D. G. (1996). Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Orzack, S. H., & Sober, E. (1993). A critical assessment of Levins’s The Strategy of
Model Building in Population Biology (1966). The Quarterly Review of Biology,
68(4), 533–546.
Parker, W. S. (2011). When climate models agree: The significance of robust model
predictions. Philosophy of Science, 78(4), 579–600.
Perrin, J. (1913). Les Atomes (trans: Hammick, D. Ll.). Woodbridge, Conn: Ox
Bow Press.
Reichenbach, H. (1956). The Direction of Time. Berkeley, Cal: University of Cali-
fornia Press.
Stolarz-Fantino, S., Fantino, E., Zizzo, D. J., & Wen, J. (2003). The conjunction ef-
fect: New evidence for robustness. The American Journal of Psychology, 116(1),
15–34.
Weisberg, M., & Reisman, K. (2008). The robust Volterra principle. Philosophy of
Science, 75(1), 106–131.
Wimsatt, W. C. (1981). Robustness, reliability, and overdetermination. In M. B.
Brewer and B. E. Collins (Eds.), Scientific Inquiry and the Social Sciences (pp.
125–163). New York: Jossey-Bass. Page references are to the version reprinted
in (Wimsatt 2007).
Wimsatt, W. C. (1994). The ontology of complex systems: Levels of organization,
perspectives, and causal thickets. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 24(sup1),
207–274. Page references are to the version reprinted in (Wimsatt 2007).
Wimsatt, W. C. (2007). Re-Engineering Philosophy for Limited Beings. Cambridge,
Mass: Harvard University Press.
Woodward, J. (2006). Some varieties of robustness. Journal of Economic Method-
ology, 13(2), 219–240.
